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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (A CONTRA VIEW)*
One of the most interesting phases of the law, today is the
struggle of the alleged right to an inviolate personality, the
right of privacy, to gain recognition as a common law right in
the courts of the several American state and federal juris-
dictions.
The doctrine that such a right has been indirectly, and
should be directly, protected by the courts appears to have had
its origin in that fountain-head of discussion, comment, crit-
icism, litigation, and, perhaps, even legislation-The Right to
Privacy, by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.'
Since 1890, when this famous article first appeared, the
right of privacy has been expressly accorded a common law
standing in four jurisdictions-Georgia in 1905,2 Kentucky in
1909,3 and again in 1927,4 Missouri in 1910,5 and Kansas in
* This paper, presenting a view on "The Right of Privacy," contra
to that taken by Professor Moreland in the preceding article in this
issue, Is presented in order that the reader may have both views of
this Interesting question.
14 Harvard Law Review 193.
2Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68,
69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104. In this case the defendant com-
pany published plaintiff's picture in an insurance advertisement,
together with statements purported to be made by the man whose
picture was given. Plaintiff's name was not used. It was held that
plaintiff had a cause of action for violation of his right of privacy, and
for libel. This is the leading case recognizing the right of privacy.
$'oster-Milburn v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364. Plaintiff's
picture and purported letter of recommendation were published in a
patent medicine advertisement. Recovery was had for libel, and the
court stated, obiter, that a man has a cause of action for violation of
his right of privacy.4Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967. Plaintiff was a
debtor of defendant. Defendant, a garage man, put a large sign, 8x5
ft., in his window, reading as follows: "Notice. Dr. W. R. Morgan owes
an account here of $49.67, and if promises would pay an account, this
account would have been paid long ago. This account will be adver-
tised as long as it remains unpaid." In Kentucky, truth is a statutory
defense to libel. Yet the court allowed recovery on the ground that
defendant had violated plaintiff's right of privacy. This is merely an
illustration of the almost unlimited scope of the doctrine of the right
of privacy.5Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076. This was
another "picture-ad" case. Picture of plaintiff, a five-year-old boy, was
used In a jewelry advertisement. The court decided that plaintiff's
property right in his picture was violated, and that libel also would
lie. The property right element weakens the case as authority for
recognizing the right of privacy, but the court seemed to think that
this was the right it was protecting.
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1918.6 The right of privacy has been flatly rejected by the
highest courts in four states-M1fichigan in 1899,7 New York in
1902,8 Rhode Island in 1909, 9 and Washington in 1911.10 There
is considerable doubt as to the status of the right in the federal
courts, although in one case it was rejected.' 1 The question has
never been passed on by the United States Supreme Court.
In many instances relief has been granted in eases which
could have been placed on the ground that plaintiff's right of
OXunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532, L. R. A. 1918D, 1151.
This is a slightly different type "picture-ad" case. Defendant sur-
reptiously took motion pictures of plaintiff while she was making
purchases at his store, then exhibited them at a local theater. Damages
were allowed plaintiff for the violation of her right of privacy, on the
authority of the Georgia and Missouri cases, supra ns. 2 and 5.
TAtkinson v. Doherty, 21 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285, 46 L. R. A. 219.
In an action to restrain the use of her deceased husband's name and
likeness on a cigar label, plaintiff was denied an injunction on the
ground that there is no common law right of privacy. The case could
have been decided on the ground that the right of privacy is a per-
sonal right, hence died with the person whose name and likeness were
being used; but the case was not put on this basis, and seems sound
authority for rejecting the right in its entirety.8R oberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
442, 89 A. S. R. 828, 59 L. R. A. 478. An injunction and damages were
both denied a young lady whose picture was, without her consent,
used to adorn posters advertising a certain brand of flour. The right
of privacy was refused recognition by a divided court. This is the
leading case rejecting the right.
*Henry v. Cherry et al, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cases 1006. Defendant used plain-
tiff's picture in a raincoat ad. The declaration was in trespass vi et
armis for invading plaintiff's right of privacy. The court held that it
was powerless to give relief, since the right of privacy was unknown
to the common law.
"Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594, 35
L. R. A. (N. S.) 595. The picture of a socially prominent young woman
was published in connection with a news story stating that her father
was accused of a certain crime. Recovery was sought on both libel
and right of privacy grounds. The court held that there was no libel
in this case, and that there is no right of privacy which the law will
protect.
"Peck v. Tribune Co. (1907), 154 Fed. 330. A picture of the plain-
tiff, but not her name, was used in an advertisement indorsing a cer-
tain brand of whisky. The court refused to recognize the right of
privacy as such, and held that there was no question of libel for the
jury. The case was reversed on this latter holding, but the Supreme
Court did not decide the right of privacy question. 214 U. S. 185, 53
L. ed. 969, 29 Sup. St. R. 554, 16 Ann. Cases 1075. But see Corliss v.
Walker (1899) 64 Fed. 280, 31 L. R. A. 283; Von Thoaorovich v. Franz
Joseph Benefical Co. (1907) 154 Fed. 911; and Vassar College v. Loose.
Wiles Biscuit Co. (1912) 197 Fed. 982. In these cases, the courts took
the attitude that there may be a right of privacy, but the particular
case up for decision did not involve a violation of that right.
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privacy was invaded, but were not so placed; 12 or the ground of
recovery is doubtful. 13 In some jurisdictions, relief has been
denied in cases where the plaintiff's right of privacy, if he has
such a right, was violated, but the court does not discuss the right
in handing down the decision.14 In a few cases, relief was denied
because of the exceptions to the right of privacy,' 5 but the
question of the existence of the substantive right was not
decided.16
12Most of the literary property, and breach of contract or trust,
cases which involve the publication of photographs or private writings
can be classed here. A few of the leading ones are Denis v. Leclerc(1811) 1 "Martin (La.) 297, 5 Am. Dec. 712; Woolsey v. Judd (1855)
4 Duer (N. Y.) 379; Grigsby v. Breckenridge (1867) 2 Bush (Ky.) 480;
Klug v. 87zeriffs (1906) 129 Wis. 468, 109 N. W. 656; Douglas v. Stokes(1912) 149 Ky. 506, 1:49 S. W. 849, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 386. See also
Edison v. Edison Polyform, Mfg. Co. (1907) 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392,
'here the use of Edison's name and picture was restrained because it
might expose him to liability; and Vanderbilt v. Mitchel, 67 Atl. 97,
72 N. J. Eq. 910 (1907), where the illegitimate son of plaintiff's wife
was restrained from using plaintiff's name or claiming to be his son.
The decision was based on the fact that property rights of the plaintiff
were jeopardized. Compare Baker v. Libbie, (1912) 210 Mass. 599, 97
N. E. 109, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 944, Ann. Cases 1912D, 551, where the
literary property law gave protection when the right of privacy doc-
trine probably would not.
1Itzkovitch v. Whitaker (1905) 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499, 1 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1147; Schaulman v. Whitaker (1905) 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737,
7 L. R. A. (N. S. 274. Injunctions were granted to restrain an officer
from posting in the rogues' gallery pictures of suspects. But see
Hodgeman v. Olsen (1915) 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122, L. R. A. 1916A,
739; and Marby v. Kettering (1909) 89 Ark. 551, 117 S. W. 746, for
cases denying injunctive relief in slightly different circumstances.
'
4f7kappelZ v. Stewart (1896) 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542, 37 L. R. A.
783, 51 Am. St. Rep. 476. Injunctive relief was denied a man who was
being shadowed by detectives. However, the court denied relief on
the ground that equity had no jurisdiction of the case, since the remedy
at law was adequate, and a personal right only was being invaded; and
not because there is no right of privacy. In Schultz v. Insurance Co.(1913) 151 Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386, however, "rough shadowing" was
held actionable.
" The exceptions set out by Warren and Brandeis are: (1) The
right to privacy does not prohibit publication of matter of public or
general interest; (2) the right to privacy does not prohibit the com-
munication of matter under circumstances rendering it privileged
according to the law of slander and libel; (3) the law would probably
not grant redress for invasion of privacy by oral publication in the
absence of special damage; (4) the right to privacy ceases upon the
publication of the facts by the individual or with his consent. 4 Har-
vard Law Review 193 at 214; 216, 217, 218. These exceptions were
recognized, obiter, in Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 2,
and in Brents v. Morgan, supra n. 4.
"Smith v. Surratt (1926) 7 Alaska 416, and Jones v. Herald Post
(1929) 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 973. See also Corliss v. Walker, and
Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., supra n. 11.
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The reasons for and against judicial recognition of the right
are many and varied. The chief reasons advanced by Messrs.
Warren and Brandeis seem to be: (1) The right has been pro-
tected in the past through legal fictions, and should be expressly
recognized. 17 (2) The logical development of the common law
in gradually protecting more and more of the rights of in-
dividuals demands that the right to privacy be protected.' 8
(3) Modern social and scientific development makes it imper-
ative that some such protection as that accorded by recognition
of the right of privacy be given by the law.19 Pavesicz v. New
England Life Ins. Co. adds that the right of privacy is (1) based
on natural law,20 and is (2) "recognized by the principles of
municipal law, and guaranteed to persons in this state both by
the Constitutions of the United States and of the state of
Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall
be deprived of liberty except by due process of law.
2 1
Munden v. Harris2 2 was expressly placed on a property
right basis, a ground relied on by Judge Gray, dissenting, in
Schuyler v. Curtis,23 and in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
27 "These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection
afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the
medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing
publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more
general right of the individual to be let alone." 4 H. L. R. 193, 205.
'-4 Harvard Law Review 193, 194, 195.
39"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person and for
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the 'right to be let
alone.' Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.' Of the desirability-indeed the necessity-of some such
protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt." 4 Harvard Law
Review 193, at 195 and 196.
"The right of privacy has its foundations in the instincts of
nature. It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being the witness
that can be called to establish its existence. Any person whose intel-
lect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to each indi-
vidual member of society, there are matters private, and there are
matters public so far as the individual is concerned. Each individual
as instinctively resents an encroachment by the public upon his rights
which are of a private nature, as he does the withdrawal of those of
his rights which are of a public nature. A right of privacy in matters
purely private is therefore derived from natural law." 50 S. E. 68 at
69; 122 Ga. 190.
2150 S. E. 68 at 71; 122 Ga. 190.
2 Hupra n. 5.
2"I cannot see why the right of privacy is not a form of property,
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(10.24 Such an analysis, however, appears to be inconsistent
with placing the case on a right of privacy foundation. From
its inception, 0 the right of privacy has been regarded as a per-
sonal right. If the Mlissouri court based its decision on plain-
tiff's alleged property right, the discussion of the right of
privacy was either logically unsound or purely obiter.
The chief reasons against recognizing the right are ably
advanced in two or three of the leading cases. In Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., the main English cases relied on by
the proponents of the right 26 are analyzed and the conclusion
(which this writer believes to be sound) was reached that the
eases do not support the right of privacy as claimed.2-  The
court also concluded that recognition of the right by the courts
would be contrary to the common law,2 8 but that appropriate
remedies might be had by legislative action.29 The somewhat
less persuasive reason that recognition of the right would neces-
as much as is the right of complete immunity of one's person." 42 N.
E. 22, 28; 147 N. Y. 434; 31 L. R. A. 286, 293.
2 Supra n. 8. Judge Gray's searching for a property right may be
explained by the fact that in both the New York cases equitable relief
was asked. This was not the case in Munden v. Harris.
21 Cooley on Torts, 10 ed. 6. 364; Ragland, Thi Right of Privacy,
17 Ky. L. J. 85, 114; 21 R. C. L. 1197; Long, 33 Yale Law Journal, 115;
Atkinson v. Doherty, supra n. 7.
2' Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Macn. & G. 25, 2 De Gex & S. 652, 64
Eng. Rep. 293; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. R. 670; Pollard
v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345; Mayall v. Higbey, 1 Hurl. & C.
148; Duke of Queensbury v. Shebeare, 2 Eden, 329.
" "In not one of these cages, therefore, was it the basis of the
decision that the defendant could be restrained from performing the
act he was doing or threatening to do on the ground that the feelings
of the plaintiff would be thereby injured; but, on the contrary, each
decision was rested either upon the ground of breach of trust, or that
plaintiff had a property right in the subject of the litigation which
the court could protect." 64 N. E. 442, 445; 171 N. Y. 538.
" "An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion
that the so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abiding
place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now
be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by
which the profession and the public have been long guided." 64 N. E.
442, 447; 171 N. Y. 538.
20"The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily
provide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose
to use the picture or the name of another for advertising purposes
without his consent." 64 N. E. 442, 443. This is exactly what the New
York legislature did within the following year. Chap. 132 of the Laws
of New York of 1903, p. 308. Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York,
1923, chap. 7, secs. 50 and 51.
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sarily result in a vast amount of litigation was also advanced in
support of the rejection of the right.30
In Henry v. Cherry, the court ably analyzed the leading
case of Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. and came to the
sound conclusion that natural justice is not a valid foundation
for present day law,31 and that there are no constitutional pro-
visions warranting the courts in granting relief in right bf pri-
vacy cases in the absence of a legislative declaration that such
a right will be protected.32 As far as the federal constitution
is concerned, the Rhode Island court has the support of the
United States Supreme Court in saying that there are no con-
stitutional guarantees to a right of privacy.33
Thus we see that the substantive right of privacy has been
recognized in a few states, and expressly rejected in as many
more. The reasons advanced pro and con are as contradictory
as the various holdings. The nature of the right remains un-
defined, and, we fear, undefinable. Its status is still a moot
question in most of the American jurisdictions.
TBE REMEDIAL ASPECT OP THE PROBLEM
The problem of remedies for an invasion, or threatened in-
"If such a principle be incorporated into the body of the law
through the instrumentality of a court of equity, the attempts to logic-
ally apply the principle will necessarily result not only in a vast
amount of litigation, but in litigation bordering on the absurd, for the
right of privacy, once established as a legal doctrine, cannot be con-
fined to the restraint of a publication of a likeness, but must neces-
sarily embrace as well the publication of a word picture, a comment
upon one's looks, conduct, domestic relations, or habits." 64 N. E. 442,
443; 171 N. Y. 538. That this objection of Chief Justice Parker was
not entirely unwarranted is shown by the peculiar result reached by
the Kentucky court in Brents v. Morgan, supra n. 4.
u "It has been shown that natural justice is not law. To make It
law is therefore a legislative act, forbidden by the constitution to the
courts of this state." 73 Atl. 97 at 106; 30 R. I. 13.
" "Under our Constitution (article 3): "The powers of the govern-
ment shall be distributed into three departments, the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial.' The function of adjusting remedies to rights Is a
legislative rather than a judicial one, and up to the present time the
Legislature of this state has omitted to provide a remedy for invasion
of the right of privacy." 73 Atl. 97, 107; 30 R. I. 13.
13"But, as we have stated, neither the 14th amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon
the states any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of
silence;' nor, we may add, does it confer any right of privacy upon
either persons or corporations." PrudentiaZ Insurance Company of
America v. Cheekc, 259 U. S. 530 at 543, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep.
516, 27 A. L. R. 27.
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vasion of a person's right of privacy is relatively less important
than the question of the recognition of the substantive right.
The civil remedies are twofold: (1) Damages in a tort action
for past invasion, and (2) An injunction in a suit in equiity to
restrain future invasion. Once the right is recognized as a sub-
stantive right, damages for its invasion will be allowed as a
matter of course. 34 But grounds sufficient to warrant the in-
terference of equity would be more difficult to find.
It is a well established principle that equity interferes to
protect only property rights.35 However, a court that wishes
to protect the right of privacy should find no trouble in avoid-
ing this rule.36 It can do as the Missouri court did in Munden
v. Harris,37 and find a property right at stake; or it can cast
aside the old restrictions, on the authority of the "rogues' gal-
lery" cases,38 and the dicta in such cases as Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 9 and protect purely personal rights without resorting
to the use of legal fictions.
A court which would be willing to depart far enough from
the principles of the common law to recognize the right of pri-
vacy, could, with less deviation from established principles,
concede that equity has the power to protect the right thus rec-
ognized. It is interesting to note, however, that in the right of
privacy eases where an injunction was asked, relief was
denied ;40 but it was denied on the ground that the law knew no
substantive right of privacy, and not on the ground that the
right, if it exists, can not be protected in equity.
" 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 219; 17 Kentucky Law Journal 85,
113.
" Gee v. Pritchard, supra n. 25; ChappelN v. Stewart, n. 14; Corliss
V. Walcer, n. 11; Bispham on Equity, 10 ed., p. 738; Kerr on Injunc-
tions pp. 1, 2; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210, 31 L. ed. 402, 405.
""If the right of, privacy succeeds in establishing itself, injunction,
as the only effective remedy, is likely also to establish itself for such
cases." 29 Harvard Law Review 640, 672.
"Bupra n. 5.
' Supra n. 13.
n"If It appeared in this case that only the complainant's status
and personal rights were thus threatened or thus invaded by the action
of the defendants and by the filing of the false certificates, we should
hold, and without hesitation, that an individual has rights, other than
property rights which he can enforce in a court of equity and which
a court of equity will enforce against invasion." 67 Atl. 97, 99.
'Atkinson v. Doherty, supra n. 7; Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., supra n. 8.
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CONCLUSION
The right of privacy, by this or any other name, was
unknown to common law. There are cases where a person's
privacy has been protected, but this was not the ground on
which relief was given, but coupled with some other, usually
property, right of the plaintiff that was being violated.
The right of privacy is for the most part an unnecessary
right. With the modern definitions of property, thoughts and
emotions which have been recorded in permanent form will be
protected from exposition to the public. Under the laws of
slander and libel, recovery can be had if the plaintiff is in fact
unjustly exposed to hatred, ridicule, obloquy, or contempt before
the public. Under breach of contract or trust, recovery can be
had in many other cases. In the first three of the five cases
allowing recovery for violation of the right of privacy, the court
also decided that libel would lie. In the fourth, libel was not
alleged; and in the fifth, truth was a statutory defense.
Privacy, save in perhaps a very few phases, is adequately
protected by existing rules of law. If additional protection is
needed, it can be adequately supplied by legislative action, as
,was done in New York; and the courts will be saved the embar-
rassment of recognizing principles contrary to the common law,
and principles which, when carried to their logical conclusions,
will allow recovery in many unjustifiable cases.
However, the right of privacy has been given a common
law standing in four state jurisdictions. Damages are given
for its invasion, and the courts would probably not hesitate to
give injunctive relief were the substantive right shown to be
imminently in danger. What stand the courts in the jurisdic-
tions where the question has not been decided will take is impos-
sible to forecast. Authority is now available to support either
side. A technical argument, at least apparently sound, can be
worked out to support either position. Public policy arguments
might well be offered for both sides, and a court should have no
difficulty in upholding its desired position.
But the fact that only eight jurisdictions have unequiv-
ocally passed on the status of the right in the forty years since
it was first propounded is persuasive evidence that the protec-
tion to be afforded by recognition of the right is not as badly
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needed as is often supposed; and the existence of the so-called
common law "right of privacy" will probably remain a moot,
and for the most part an academic, question in most of the states
for some time to come.
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